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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
A title, like "On the Way to Truth", requires an explanation, in
fact, a two-fold explanation.

It requires such an explanation because

it is both methodologically and thematically suggestive.

These aspects

of the title will be discussed in the next sections of this introduction.
The first of these sections will deal with the methodological implications.

The second section will contain an introductory discussion of

the subject indicated by the title.
METHOD OF

PROCEDUP~

"On the Way to Truth" is more than a catchy title for a treatise
on truth.
presented.

It characterizes the type of investigation that is being
Unlike the title "Arrival at Truth", "On the Way to Truth"

does not suggest the ending or final completion of an investigation.
Unlike "Starting tovmrd Truth", it does not indicate the initial efforts
in a new area.

The concept of truth has been studied for a long time

and will continue to be debated long after this volume is forgotten.
The purpose of this paper is to pave some new ground for our collective
journey towards a fuller understanding of what truth is.
"On the Way to Truth" is also suggestive of Hartin Heidegger's
words and method.

It could be called an adaption of Heidegger's title

Unterwegs zur Sprache.

1

Even more important than this, is the

1

Peter Hertz in translating this work into English has given it
the title On the Way to Language.
1

2

methodological resemblance that it suggests.

Both Heidegger's work and

this paper are investigations which are "unterwegs", that is, "on the
way", in process but not completed.

Both projects are done with a view

to further development.
The announcement of some congruence between Heidegger's work
and this paper should not be taken as implying that this volume is the
furthering of the Heideggerian program, because it is not.

It can not

stand as the next step in the Heideggerian enterprise for four reasons.
In the first place the methodological resemblance is not unique to the
Heideggerian program.

Secondly, Heidegger's work is not centered on the

same topic that this paper is.
different biases.

Thirdly, the two investigations hold to

Lastly, there exist methodological differences between

Heidegger's project and this investigation.

J. L. Mehta in The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger makes two
points which support the above assertion that the concept of philosophy
as "unterwegs" is not unique to Dr. Heidegger's work.

In the preface

of the above mentioned book, Dr. Mehta states that all philosophy is
thought which can be characterized as "unterwegs":
The finitude of human thought lies in the fact that it
is prompted by a profound need to raise and answer questions
about ultimate truth and is at the same time incapable of
arriving at any definitive, eternally valid formulation. It
is always unterwegs, under way, both in the thinking of
individual philosophers and in the collective, historical
thinking of an epoch and a people, though hardly ever aware
of itself as being so and treading sometimes with the
arrogant mien of being in possession of a total final
VLSLon. It is ever on its way, groping and fumbling, towards
a dimly perceived goal, not only in regard to the conditions
of historical or biographical development but also in respect
of the moves, techniques and methods . . . • 2
This statement is supportive of the assertion that a concept of philosophy
2

J. L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p. ix.

3

as "unterwegs" is not unique to Heidegger's way of thought in two ways.
First, it supports this assertion by being a statement about what Dr.
Mehta personally believes philosophy to be.

The statement occurs in the

context of J. L. Hehta's presentation of his thesis:
The following pages attempt to show how this conception
of philosophy as a "way" and as being "on the way" is
explicitly recognized and concretely exemplified in the
3
thinking of the great German philosopher Martin Heidegger.
This thesis is very clearly established in the book.

Secondly, it

supports the assertion in question by implying that there have been
other philosophers throughout the ages who have conceived of philosophy
in the same way that Heidegger and he himself have.

The second point

that he makes which is supportive of the assertion under discussion
is that there is not as wide a gulf between contemporary Anglo-American
philosophizing and the thinking of Martin Heidegger as many have
thought.
It may, however, be pointed out that, despite differences
in starting-point and contextual milieu, contemporary analytical philosophy is in pursuit of aims which are not themselves
basically different from those of phenomenology. Both analytical philosophy and phenomenology subserve at bottom a common
logos, discourse aimed at disclosure of what is hidden and
implicit in experience, in the way we understand things, in
language. What Moore and Price seek, what Wittgenstein and
Wisdom, Ryle and Austin achieve, is illumination and disclosure of hidden structures, helping us, in F. Waismann's
words, "to open our eyes, to bring us to see things in a new
way." In his own way, and perhaps in a profounder sense,
this is just what Heidegger does all the time, bringing some
4
"state of affairs" into view, letting what is come to light.
Mehta's further elucidation here is supportive of the assertion that a
concept of philosophy as "unterwegs" is not unique to Heidegger's way

3
Mehta, p. ix.
4

Mehta, pp. xiii-xiv.

4

of thinking in establishing a greater degree of commonality between
contemporary Anglo-American and Heideggerian methodology.

Considering

the support that has been given, it seems clear that the concept of
philosophy as "unterwegs" is not unique to Heideggerian thought.
Heidegger, if he were still alive, would not accept this project
as a furthering of his work, or even a truly philosophic endeavor,
because it is not an investigation into being.
this paper is not about being but truth.

The driving question of

Heidegger conceives of

philosophy as the attempt to become clear about the nature of being
by asking the question, "Why are there essents [things that are] rather
than nothing?"

5

According to Heidegger, philosophy is not interested

in what populates the world, but why it does.

Questions about what we

encounter in the world, be they questions concerning animals or concepts, belong to the particular sciences.

In Heidegger's eyes our

investigation would be philological rather than philosophical.
Heidegger would also not think very highly of the suggestion
that this investigation is a piece of philosophizing in the Heideggerian
style, because of his bias against the concept of Christian philosophy.
In fact, Dr. Heidegger once wrote that Christian philosophy is a "round
square and a misunderstanding."

6

It is an impossibility, in Heidegger's

eyes, not because Christians cannot think, but because they already
have the answer to the question of philosophy.

Concerning Christians,

he alleges:
Anyone for whom the Bible is divine revelation and truth

5
Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph
Manheim (Anchor Books ed.; Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961),
p. 1.
6
Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 6.

5

has the answer to the question "Why are there essents rather
than nothing?" even before it is asked: everything that is,
except God himself, has been created by Him. God himself, the
increate creator, "is." 7
Lastly, this investigation does not fit comfortably into the
Heideggerian mold, because it differs in method.

Even though the

Heideggerian corpus and this paper exhibit an interest in the history
of philosophy and in exegesis, their views in these areas differ considerably.

Heidegger is interested only in the Western philosophic

tradition from the Presocratic philosophers through Nietzsche.

8

On the

other hand, this paper will deal with three periods of history, only
one of which is of interest to Heidegger.
has an interest in Greek philosophy.

Like Heidegger, this author

Unlike Heidegger, he is vitally

interested in contemporary philosophy and Biblical thought.

Not only

is there a difference in terms of historical interests, different
views are held by the two authors with regard to the nature of exegesis.
In the process of commenting on lines 332-75 of Sophocles' Antigone,
Heidegger makes the following statement concerning exegesis:
The actual interpretation must show what does not stand
in the words and is nevertheless said. He must seek the
essential where nothing more is to be found by the scientific interpretation that brands as unscientific everything
that transcends its limits.9
For Heidegger, the last step in exegesis is the revealing of what was
left unsaid, but intended, by the author.
question behind the question:
inside the head of the author.

7
8

This is a sort of asking the

It is a guessing at what is happening
Because the analysis of supposed

Ibid.

Mehta, p. 123.

9Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 136.

6

intentions is so speculative, this paper will be limited, for the most
part, to a more scientific style of exegesis.
Having turned from the Heideggerian banner, one might well ask
under whose banner has this assault upon the hinderland of truth been
made.

If not some Continental giant like Heidegger, then perhaps under

the banner of some Anglo-Saxon philosopher?

While moving within the

spirit of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, this paper does not parade behind the
banner of any one Anglo-Saxon philosopher.

But how can this be'?'

It

is because the philosophic labels, the old banners of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, have been swept away.
Just prior to his death in October, 1976, Prof. Ryle very ably
described how these old banners were swept away in an article entitled
"Fifty Years of Philosophy and Philosophers."

In this article he

commented:
We could not care or even remember on which philosophical
ticket he or she or we ourselves had formerly voted or could
be relied on to vote tomorrow. So we unconsciously gave up
bothering ourselves with the sectarian and electoral designations. They stopped designating. 10
Probably of as great an importance as these sociological imputs
to the sweeping away of the old banners, was the realization by most
English speaking philosophers that Wittgenstein was correct when he wrote,
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.
Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions',
but rather in the clarification of propositions.
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and
indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them
sharp boundaries.ll
10

Gilbert Ryle, "Fifty Years of Philosophy and Philosophers,"
Philosophy, LI, No. 198 (1976), 385.
11

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F.
Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 49.

7

But what did this mean to philosophers?

It meant that a philosophy was

not a collection of doctrines, an intellectual position which stood in
opposition to other such collections.

Philosophy had become the collec-

tive enterprise of elucidating language.

The question "Who do you

support?" was dropped in favor of the question "What concepts interest
you?"

And with the change in questions, the old banners became remnants

of a bygone age.
In summation, the investigative method captured in the title
"On the Way to Truth" can be characterized in the following five ways:
1.

It is philosophical in the Wittgensteinian sense of the

word, because its goal is the clarification of a concept.
2.

It is historical in that it deals with our understanding of

truth at various periods in the course of human history.
3.

It is scientifically exegetical, because it is concerned

with the expressed meaning only, and not any of the supposedly intended
meanings.
4.

It is comparative in that it strives to relate various

systems in a synthetic way.
5.

It is projective in that it is an attempt to move into new

territory in a way that is determined by the historical development of
the concept under investigation.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
If we are to be truly philosophical in the Wittgensteinian
sense, we should turn from the question "Who do we support?" to the
question "What concepts interest us?"

In turning to this question, we

are again brought back to the title, "On the Way to Truth."

The first

8

words of the title suggested the method.

The last word determines the

theme, the topic, of this investigation.

This work is concerned with

the notion of truth.
Our notion of truth is indeed very rich and much too complex for
one brief investigation.

A full treatment of this concept would involve

not only an inquiry into the meaning of truth, but would involve a
cataloging of the items we commonly label as "true."

Such a cataloging,

even of just the truths of Christianity, would require thousands of
volumes this size.

Therefore, this volume will be limited to a dis-

cussion of the meaning of truth.
Despite the fact that we are not interested in cataloging
various truths, an understanding of the things that we call "true" will
aid us in further limiting our investigation.
his book Truth states:

Prof. Alan R. White in

"The things that we call "true" fall into two

classes, namely, what is said and things other than what is said."

12

In the first class of things, i.e., the things that are said, we find
statements, accounts, stories, etc.

The second class of things is

represented by objects, such as, paper and ink, and concepts, such as,
goodness and beauty.

Items in the first class are called "true" for a

different reason, than the items of the second class.

According to

p

When an X, e.g., a statement or a story, is characterized as true in virtue of what is said in it rather than
for itself, such an X is a true X if and only if what is
said in it is true. 1.Jhen, on the other hand, an X, e.g.,
a Corgi or courage, is characterized as true other than
because of what is said in it, an X is a true X if and only
if according to some restrictive standards of X it is true
to say that it is an x.l3

12

Alan R. White, Truth (Anchor Books ed.; Garden City: Doubleday

& Company, Inc., 1970), p. 3.
13Wh.1te, p. 5.

9

The first use of the word "true" is its primary sense, because,
. . . the whole point of characterizing some X other
than what is said as true is to suggest that "X 11 is here
being used according to some restrictive standards by which
not everything which is called by that word is, in the
user's opinion, truly so called.l4
Because this second sense of truth is not primary, it will be regarded
as superfluous and omitted from our considerations.
Having limited the discussion to the truth of what is said,
it becomes incumbent upon us to distinguish what is said from several
closely related things.

Prof. White states,

We can distinguish what is said, e.g., that there is
life after death, from (1) what is used to say it, e.g.,
the English words uttered or written in order to convey
it; from (2) what it is the content of, e.g., the assumption, claim, conclusion, objection, warning, belief, hope,
or fear that there is a life after death; ang from (3)
the saying of it, e.g., by the local vicar. 1
What Prof. White is saying is that we must separate what is said from
the act complex involved with it.

We must not confuse what is said

with the act of saying it, with that act's artifact or with that act's
purpose.
This is the type of distinction that J. L. Austin was trying to
create when he distinguished between performative and constative.

16

Prof. Austin used these two words to classify types of statements.

The

term "statement", like the term "proposition", refers to what is said
by a string of meaningful symbols which we call a sentence.

What J. L.

Austin saw as distinguishing a performative statement from a constative

14

Ibid.

15Wh.t
1 e, p. 7.
16

J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. J. 0. Urmson
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 1-11.

10

statement was (1) whether or not it described or reported something; and
(2) whether or not it was part of doing an action.

If a statement did

not describe or report, and was involved in the doing of an action,
then it can be classed as a performative statement.

If the opposite

were the case, then the statement would be classed with the constatives.
The importance of this distinction to what Prof. White has said
is that it adds to our understanding of the distinction between what
is said and the act complex involved in saying it.

Prof. Austin has

added to our understanding of the act complex by showing us that some
statements are part of the act complex to which they are related and
not part of what is said.

For example, the statement, "I pronounce you

man and wife," is not a description of a couple's relationship but a
part of the act of uniting them in holy matrimony.

This means that a

performative differs from a constative in being the expression of an
act and not the description of that act.
Now the distinction between what is said and the act complex
involved in saying it, is important to us because only what is said
can be true in the primary sense of the term.

The act of saying that

there is life after death by the local vicar is properly speaking neither
true nor false, but only appropriate or inappropriate.
waul

d he appropriate for the vi car to say it at a

likely, inappropriate at a christening.

For example, it

fune.r-i;:ja..~.1.........aw.n.ud.J.-,-.-,....mLuO~s-~.t--------

Similarly, the artifact of

this expression, the ink marks on the page, can be judged as true in
only the secondary sense of the term.
synonym for "proper" or "well-formed."

In this sense, "true" becomes a
Lastly, even though this ex-

pression can be used to express a truth, it can be used to generate
hope, as well.

11
In summation, four limitations have been placed upon this investigation.

First, taking a lead from the title, the investigation has

been limited to a discussion of the notion of truth.

Realizing the

immensity of the task, it was decided to investigate only the meaning
of truth, and not to become involved in the cataloging of truths.

In

the third place, the study has been limited to the primary sense of
the word "true", that is, as it is applied to what is said.

Last, it

was found that not everything that could be said was either true or
false in the primary sense of the word, and decided to exclude the truth
of performative utterances from our investigation.

By means of these

restrictions, this study has been limited to an investigation of the
truth of what is said.
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Having limited the investigation to the truth of what is said,
what problems can be discussed?

The crucial disagreements appear to

deal with particular truths, and not the nature of truth.

The populace

is more interested in the truths of the environmental sciences or the
Christian faith than the definition of truth.

The man on the street,

unlike Pilate, rarely asks, "What is truth?"
Even more debatable than the hazards of smoking, is the nature
of truth, especially the truth of what is said.

The nature of truth is

more hotly debated now than at any other time in history.

Prior to

the development of the Pragmatic Theory of truth, only three theories
of truth had been considered in the Western world.

They are the Platon-

istic Correspondence Theory, the Idealistic Coherence Theory and the
Presocratic Existence Theory.

After the Pragmatic Theory's development,

12
debate intensified.

Several new theories, such as, the Non-Descriptive

Theory of truth, were formulated.
Inquiry into the nature of truth increased because philosophers
began to find the traditional analysis to be inadequate.

While it was

generally agreed that a statement was true because it corresponded to
a fact, there was no such consensus about the definition of correspondence.

This proved to be a real problem when correspondence was applied

as the criteria for truth.

Without a definition of correspondence,

the determination of a statement's truth could not be handled mechanically: a computer could not be programmed to determine a statement's
truth.

The determination of particular truths was realized to be very

subjective.
Having uncovered this flaw, contemporary, Western man has looked
for more in truth than a mere correspondence between what is and what
is said.

Without complete success, they have tried to link with the

belief that truth is the correspondence of statements with the world,
an acceptability qualifier.
for truth.

An acceptability qualifier is a criteria

It is most adequate when it is a mechanically decidable

method for determining a statement's truth.
It is this failure on the part of contemporary, Western man that
has generated this paper.

This investigations goal is two fold.

First,

it must establish that contemporary, Western man has looked and failed.
It must be established that contemporary, Western man sees more in
truth than a mere correspondence between what is and what is said and
that he is trying, though without complete success, to link with the
belief that truth is the correspondence of statements with the world, an
acceptability qualifier.

Having established this first point, a new

13

direction will be suggested that will point toward a more mechanical
understanding of the acceptability qualifier.
JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY
This study finds its justification in two sources.
source is the perennial confusion over the nature of truth.

The first
This con-

fusion is seen in the fact that truth is seen as being everything from
the correspondence of statements to the world, to a logical superfluity.
A second source of justification is the writer's commitment to the
Wittgensteinian concept of philosophy as the elucidation of language.
The writer believes that he has a responsibility to clarify concepts
that are confused.

Therefore, seeing the confusion in the notion of

truth, the author feels obligated to clarify the concept of truth.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Before the investigation can proceed any further, there are
some terms which must be defined.

These terms are: statement, corre-

spondence, and acceptability qualifier.
Statement
A statement is what is said.

It is to be distinguished from

the saying of it, the artifacts of the act of saying it and the purpose
for which it is said.
"proposition."

It is to be considered synonymous with the word

It can be said to refer to the content of a declarative

sentence.
Correspondence
Correspondence is a relationship which can obtain between members of different set, i.e., collections of things, and between sets

14
themselves.

It is a relationship which is best understood on the model

of a matching process.
members can be matched.

Two sets are said to correspond when their
For example, there is a correspondence between

the numbers from 1 to 10 and the letters in the word "correspond."

It

is possible for a correspondence to exist between unequal, but symmetric,
groups.

An example of this type of correspondence is the relationship

between the numbers from 1 to 10 and the numbers from 1 to 100.

For the

sake of our investigation, the term "correspondence" will refer solely
to relationships of the first type, i.e., a one to one correspondence.
Acceptability Qualifier
This is a term coined by the author to refer to the criteria for
truth.

An acceptability qualifier is most adequate when it is a mechani-

cally decidable, or computable, method for determining truth.
This term is substituted for criteria in order to stress the
fact that it is this test that makes a given truth acceptable.
STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this investigation's presentation is to be
found in the next four chapters of this volume.

In the first of these

chapters, the point is made that contemporary, Western man sees more in
truth than mere correspondence, and that he is trying to link correspondence with an acceptability qualifier.

In chapter 3, a new direction

is established through a discussion of Heidegger's attack on analytical
philosophizing concerning truth, the positive statement of his own
theory, a statement of his theory's effect on the acceptability qualifier,
and an analysis of his sources.

Within the pages of chapter 4 is

revealed a Biblical Theory of truth and its answer to the question:

15
"What is the standard for material truth?"

The last chapter contains

the final statement of this paper's provisional theory of truth and its
evaluation.

Chapter 2
CONTEMPORARY, WESTERN THEORIZING
ABOUT TRUTH
In this chapter, it will become evident (1) that contemporary,
Western man sees more in truth than a mere correspondence between what
is and what is said; and (2) that he is trying, without complete success,
to link with the belief that truth is the correspondence of statements
with the world, an acceptability qualifier.

The establishment of these

points will be accomplished on the basis of the critical analysis of
three contemporary, Western theories of truth.

These theories are the

Coherence Theory, the Pragmatic Theory and the Non-Descriptive Theory.
In each case, the relationship of each theory to the Correspondence
Theory will be discussed, as well as each theory's development of the
acceptability qualifier.
The thesis concerning Western man's dissatisfaction with the
belief that truth is merely a correspondence between what is and what
is said has been framed in the contemporary period, because of the greater
availability and variety of literature for this period.

This thesis

could have been cast in terms of early Greek philosophy, but was not
because of the lack of primary sources from this period.

That there was

dissatisfaction with the Correspondence Theory in this earlier period
is evident in the conflict between the Existence Theory of truth and the
Correspondence Theory in Plato's Sophist.

16

It is, also, seen in the

17

fact that Aristotle saw the concept of future truth as being problematic.
Before the relationship of the Coherence Theory, the Pragmatic
Theory, and the Non-Descriptive Theory to the Correspondence Theory can
be intelligently discussed, the Correspondence Theory must be understood.
Therefore, the discussion of the former theories will be preceded by an
analysis of the Correspondence Theory.
THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH
Of even more help in the explanation of the Correspondence
Theory than a "slogan-like" characterization is the clarification of the
theory's central issues, or problems.

The slogan, "Truth is the corre-

spondence of what is to what is said," says much about the Correspondence Theory, but not enough.

For example, it does not explain the

nature of this relationship called correspondence.

Not only does it

not explain the nature of correspondence, it fails to define the items
related by the relationship of correspondence.

It does not define what

is meant by "what is" and "what is said".
The expression "what is" cannot refer to a single object, if
the secondary sense of truth is to be avoided.

If "what is" were a

single object, then to say that its name, i.e., the statement pertaining
to the object, is true is to only say that the correct name has been
given to the object.

To say that a fact is a single object is to imply

that statements, like, "The cat is on the mat" or "Grass is green", are
names, like "Jonathan" or "Paul".

It also implies that a true state-

ment is no more than the proper name for the object to which it refers.

1

Aristotle, De Interpretatione IX.

1

18

To imply this is to rob truth of its primary meaning.

Therefore, the

expression "what is" must be taken as referring to more than one object,
for example, to a complex of objects.
"What is said" is simply what is said.
and "proposition" can be substituted for it.
the content of a declarative sentence.

The words "statement"
It can be said to refer to

"What is said" must be distin-

guished from the saying of it, the artifacts of that act and the purpose
for which it is said.

2

These two definitions are now at a fairly high level of refinement and, for the moment, are not in need of any further clarification.
This is not the case with the notion of correspondence.

As a result,

Lord Bertrand Russell's suggestion concerning the nature of this correspondence will be examined.
Russell on Truth and Correspondence
Bertrand Russell is one of the many subscribers to the Correspondence Theory who is interested in explaining the nature of this type of
correspondence and in defining the objects of that relationship.

Lord

Russell first showed signs of an interest in the Correspondence Theory
in 1906.

3

At this time, he delivered some lectures on the subject of

truth that were later published in Philosophical Essays.

In 1912, he

refined his earlier thoughts and published them in The Problems of
Philosophy.
In The Problems of Philosophy, Mr. Russell states that,

2

See page 9 of this paper.

3A. N. Prior, "Correspondence Theory of Truth," The Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (1965), II, 226d-227a.
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. . . correspondence with fact . . . [is what constitutes]
the nature of truth. It remains to define precisely what
we mean by 'fact', and what is the nature of the correspondence which must subsist between belief and fact, in order
that belief may be true.4
For Lord Russell, truth is a property of beliefs.
true if, and only if, it corresponds to some fact.
use of the word "belief" is rather slippery.
mean what is said.

A belief is

Unfortunately, his

At one moment it may

Or, at another, it may take on more of a sense of

the statement's purpose.

Despite this slipperiness, much can be learned

from Lord Russell's theory; because his analysis is directed more at
statements than their purpose or function.
A true belief, according to Lord Russell, is not a relationship
between the belief and a single object (e.g., Desdemona's love for
Cassia), but a belief and a complex of objects (e.g., Desdemona, loving
and Cassio).

5

He feels forced to make this point in order to insure

that there can be falsehoods.

If the relationship was between a belief

and a single object, e.g., Desdemona's love for Cassia, and that
object did not exist, then the statement, "Othello believes that
Desdemona loves Cassia," would be nonsense.
because it would refer to nothing.

It would be nonsense,

Following Russell's suggestion,

even if the statement was false, it would not be nonsense.

It would not

be nonsense, because it would still refer to various objects, i.e.,
Desdemona, loving and Cassia.
Having now defined Russell's use of the terms "belief" and "fact",
the nature of the correspondence that can hold between true beliefs
and facts can be discussed.

A belief, a statement, is true, when there

4

Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1959), p. 123.
5

Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 124-130.
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exists a semi-parallelism between the last words of the statement and
the fact.

6

For example, the statement, "Othello believes that Desdemona

loves Cassio," is true if, and only if, in fact, Desdemona loves Cassio.
If Desdemona loves Cassio, then the same order is shared by the last
words of Othello's belief, i.e., the words "Desdemona", "loves" and
"Cassio", and the fact.

It is this paralleling of the respective orders

that Russell considers to be the nature of the correspondence between
true beliefs and facts.
It should be noted that Russell's theory does not completely
agree with the Correspondence Theory as presented in this paper.

While

sharing the same view about the nature of what is, that is, that facts
are complexes of objects, the two theories differ with respect to the
definition of the first term of the relationship.
nition is more inclusive.

Mr. Russell's defi-

It allows for both what is said and its

function.
Lord Russell's analysis of the correspondence relationship is
delightful and can serve as the explanation of correspondence that this
paper has been lacking.

It can be objected that the adoption of Mr.

Russell's analysis of the correspondence relationship is not proper,
because of the difference in the two theories' view of what can serve
as the first member of the relationship.
inclusive, there is no problem.

What is true of a group in general is

always true of each of its members.
adopt Russell's analysis.

Since Russell's view is more

Therefore, it is not improper to

Since it is not improper to adopt this

analysis, it will be from this point on considered part of the Correspondence Theory presented in this paper.

6p rlor,
.
226d-227a.
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Alfred Tarski and Precision
Someone may object that the Correspondence Theory presented in
this paper lacks precision.

In fact, such an objection has been made

by the great Polish logician Alfred Tarski.

The current theory lacks

precision, because it employs two ambiguous terms, i.e., "proposition"
and "true."

7

For Prof. Tarski, the term "proposition" lacks precision,

because
. . . its meaning is notoriously a subject of lengthy
disputations by various philosophers and logicians, and it
8
seems never to have been made quite clear and unambiguous.
Similarly, Prof. Tarski considers the word "true" to be ambiguous.

He

expresses this point in these words:
The >vord "true," like other words from our everyday
language, is certainly not unambiguous. And it does not
seem to me that the philosophers who have discussed this
concept have helped to diminish its ambiguity. In works
and discussions of philosophers we meet many different conceptions of truth and falsity, and we must indicate which
conception will be the basis of our discussion.9
These points, especially the first, suggest that the Correspondence
Theory formulated in this paper is imprecise.
If this is the case, why not abandon the present theory in favor
of the correspondence theory put forward by Alfred Tarski?

His theory,

which is too technical to be presented here, has a great flaw.

The

present formulation is limited to formalized languages, like those of
mathematics and symbolic logic.

Because of this fact, a transition to

Prof. Tarski's theory will not be made.

7

Alfred Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics," Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Herbert
Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,
1949), pp. 53-54.
8

Tarski, p. 53.
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THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH
Even though the Coherence Theory is supported by a number of
Logical Positivists, namely, Carl Hempel and Otto Neurath, it is pri9
marily a doctrine of the Idealists. a

Therefore, this section will be

centered on the Coherence Theory as formulated by the Idealists.
Undoubtedly, Idealism's best exposition is to be found in A. C. Ewing's
Idealism: A Critical Survey.

Therefore, the following presentation of

the Coherence Theory will be largely based on his book.
A. C. Ewing on Coherence
In Idealism: A Critical Survey, A. C. Ewing states that, for the
Idealists,
'Coherence' is held to constitute
(a) a definition of truth, or at least an account
of its nature;
(b) an account of the nature of reality;
(c) a criterion of truth.10
It is in his chapter entitled "The Coherence Theory" that he tries to
show how this is accomplished by the Idealists.
The first reason why coherence can be employed in the definition
of truth is that what we know is identical with what is.

Mr. Ewing put

it this way:
Now

j

f truth means what is known or what facts are...-.f.o;..~;-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

cognition in so far as cognition is successful and reality
means the facts per se, the view that truth and reality
are identical may well be accepted. In so far as we know,

9

aAlan R. White, Truth (Anchor Books ed.; Garden City: Doubleday

& Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 109-110.
10
A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (London: Methuen & Co.
Ltd., 1934), p. 195.
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what we know is identical with reality or it would not be
knowledge. 11
In order for it to be known or considered to be true that there is a cat
on the mat, there must indeed be a cat on the mat.
If it were not for another belief of the Idealists, this belief
would be more support for the Correspondence Theory, than it is for the
Coherence Theory.

Both theories declare that what is, is what is true.

According to both the Coherence Theory and the Correspondence Theory,
if the world were other than what it is declared to be, then those
declarations would be false.

If there is no cat to be seen on the mat,

then the declaration, "There is a cat on the mat," would be false.
What allows the Idealists to tie this concept of truth and
coherence together is the belief that reality is one coherent system.

12

But what is it to say that reality is one coherent system?
Coherence must not be confused with self-consistency.
Anybody ~vho believed in a thoroughly pluralistic world
in which every fact was logically independent of every
other would still hold that his view was self-consistent
in that the different facts did not contradict each
other, but he certainly would not be maintaining the
coherence theory but rather its opposite. What is meant
is not merely that the different facts do not contradict
each other, which would be compatible with their being
all quite indifferent to each other logically, but that
they stand in some lositive logical relation of entailment to each other. 3
The world is coherent, because the facts of the world are both consistent with and dependent upon each other.

Because this is the case,

coherence can be used as a criterion for sorting true statements from

llEWlng,
.
p. 199 .

12 E .
w1ng, p. 228 .
13

Ewing, pp. 228-229.
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false statements.

Because it would be the case that a coherent set of

statements would represent, and would be parallel to, a set of facts.
This would not be the case with false, that is, incoherent statements;
because there would be no parallel or matching set of facts.
Having completed a discussion of the three things coherence is
said to constitute, it becomes necessary to mention a peculiar aspect
of the Coherence Theory.

This peculiar aspect is the doctrine that

statements are both partly true and partly false.

14

This seems to

conflict with the whole notion of the Coherence Theory, but really does
not.

It does not conflict, because statements are thought of as com-

plex ideas.

When it is said that the cat is on the mat, the ideas of

cat, existence, location, mat and particularity, just to name a few,
are being combined together.

For example, if the cat stood where the

missing mat normally was to be found, then the statement, "The cat is
on the mat," would not be totally false.

The ideas of cat, existence,

location and particularity would be for the most part correct.
fore, the statement would be partly true and partly false.

There-

It should

be noted that one can hold to the belief that the world is coherent
and not to the doctrine of degrees of truth, and, further, that the
doctrine of degrees of truth involves a confusing of the concepts of
. d gment
JU

15
. 1 uslon.
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Coherence and the Longings of Contemporary Man
Having briefly described the Coherence Theory, it is necessary
to show its relationship to the contentions of this paper.

14

Ewing, pp. 208-209.

15 E .
Wlng, p. 441 .
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"What is the relationship between the Coherence Theory and the Correspondence Theory?" and, "What kind of acceptability qualifier is
employed in the Coherence Theory?" must be asked and answered.
Coherence and Correspondence.

The two theories distinguished by the

terms "coherence" and "correspondence" share the same view as to the
nature of truth.

They both believe that the essence of truth is caught

in the Aristotelian dictum: "To say of what is that it is not, or of
what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is,
or of what is not that it is not, is true."

16

To the extent that each

theory holds to this dictum, they assert that a true statement corresponds to the facts of the world.

To the extent that each theory holds

to this dictum, they are correspondence theories.
Coherence and the acceptability qualifier.

For the Coherence Theorist,

correspondence is not to be regarded as the test for truth.

While

defining truth as correspondence, the Coherence Theorist turns to a
different criterion for testing truth.
qualifier.

They generate an acceptability

They state that what makes a potential truth an acceptable

one is the fact that it fits with their own thoughts.

The criterion

for truth, according to the Coherence Theory, is the coherence of
statements to each other.

For the Coherence Theorist, the question is

not, "Does it fit reality?" but, "Does it fit your system of thoughts?"
The question, "Does it fit your system of thoughts?" shows the
egoism inherent in the Coherence Theory.
human tendency to be self-centered.

Such a question exhibits the

It suggests the even more ego-

centric statement, "Of course it's true, it's just what I would have

16Tars k'~, p. 54.

26
said."

In either case, truth becomes a function of an individual's

(or possibly, a group's) theorizing.

When coherence is employed as the

acceptability qualifier, truth tends to become a subjective predicate
about statements.

Truth tends to be robbed of its objectivity.

There-

fore, if truth is to be an objective predicate of statements, then
either the acceptability qualifier must be scraped or redefined.
THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH
The Pragmatic Theory of truth is one of the few philosophical
theories to have its birth in the United States of America.

It had its

beginning in the late 1800's in the thoughts of Charles Sanders Peirce.
This theory was made popular by William James and refined by John
Dewey.

It will be this refined form of the theory that will be dis-

cussed in the following pages.
John Dewey on Truth
In Truth, Prof. White characterizes the Pragmatic Theory of
truth as the belief that, "A true idea is one which fulfills its
function, which works; a false idea is one which does not."

17

The key

word in understanding this characterization is the word "idea."

So

important is the proper conception of idea for the analysis of the
Pragmat1c Tlieory of trutli tliat John Dewey wrote, after a thorough discussion of the proper conception of ideas:
Little time is left to speak of the account of the nature
of truth given by the experimental and functional type of
logic. This is less to be regretted because this account
is completely a corollary from the nature of thinking and
ideas. If the view held as to the latter is understood, the
conception of truth follows as a matter of course. If it be

17 wh·

lte. p. 123 .
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not understood, any attempt to present the theory is
bound to be confusingi and the theory itself to seem
arbitrary and absurd. 8
Ideas.

For John Dewey's concept of idea to be understood, ideas must be

distinguished from facts and classified according to their purpose.
It must be understood that facts and ideas are different types of
things.

Further, Dewey's notion of an idea cannot be separated from

its function.

Therefore, both of these issues will be discussed.

For Mr. Dewey, ideas have an instrumental function:
According to it [that is, Dewey's notion of idea] an
idea--a term used loosely by these philosophers to cover
any "opinion, belief, statement, or what not"--is an
instrument with a particular function.l9
But what is the function of an idea?

John Dewey says of ideas that they

function in the solution of problems:
• . . ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories,
systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of
the given environment, to the removal of some specific
trouble and perplexity, •
20
Ideas function as hypotheses, proposals or plans for action in the
solution of problems.

One of the best places to look to find ideas

functioning as hypotheses is in modern science.

A look must be taken

at modern science, and not Greek science, because, unlike Greek science
which is centered in the classification of things, modern science is
21

18

John Dewey, "The Instrumentalist Account of Truth," Belief,
Knowledge, and Truth: Readings in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. Robert R.
Ammerman and Marcus G. Singer (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970),
p. 440.
19
20
21

white, pp. 122-123.
Dewey, p. 440.

sheldon P. Peterfreund, An Introduction to American Philosophy
(New York: The Odyssey Press, Inc., 1959), p. 211.
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of problem solving.

When in science, or life, an individual is faced

with a problem, he reflects until the lights go on and he has an idea,
a way out of the dilemma.

Following this model, an idea functions as

a suggested solution to the problem.

Once it has been tested and found

to work, the idea becomes transformed into a true idea, or judgment.
Granted, ideas are not facts, but why must the two be distinguished?

It is because facts confirm ideas.

If facts and ideas were

the same kinds of things, then the Pragmatic Theory would be reducible
to the Coherence Theory of truth.

It would be the same as saying that

the truth of one statement is to be found in its coherence to other
statements.

Pragmatism, on the other hand, is interested not in

coherence, but workability.
Having stressed the need to distinguish these concepts, it
becomes necessary to ask "How can facts be confused with ideas?"

They

can be confused with ideas because both facts and ideas are functional
elements in investigations.

"Facts are used in inquiry to set the terms

of the problem by marking off what is secure and unquestioned."

22

Unlike an idea which speaks about possibilities, a fact points to what
is.

A fact can be likened to the clues with which a detective works to

h.lS h ypot h esls,
.
h.lS l.d ea. 23
.
con f lrm
The criterion for truth.

"Ideas become true when thelr 'draft upon

existence' is honored by the verifying facts."

24

An idea has the poten-

tial of being true, because it promises that certain facts are going to

22

Gertrude Ezorsky, "Pragmatic Theory of Truth," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1965), VI, 429b.
23
24

Ezorsky, 429b.
Ezorsky~

429b-429c.
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be found to be the case.

For example, the idea that of the three keys

on the ring it is the green key that will open the green door promises,
that is, suggests, that, in fact, the green key will be found to be the
one that opens the green door.

When the green key opens the green door,

then the idea is judged to be true.

It is discovered that the idea

worked.
Pragmatism and the Longings of Contemporary Man
The Pragmatic Theory of truth, like the Coherence Theory, has
many ties to the theses of this paper.
Correspondence Theory of truth.

It has close ties to the

It also defines the acceptability

qualifier in a way which allows for a more objective character for truth.
Pragmatism and correspondence.

Pragmatists, like Coherence Theorists

and Correspondence Theorists, contend that true statements do correspond
to reality.

Evidence of this point can be seen in these words by

William James:

"Truth . . . is the agreement of an idea with reality."

25

This agreement is not explicately defined as a semi-parallelism between
beliefs and reality.

This agreement is understood in terms of a process

of wish fulfillment.

A statement is made and then it is fulfilled by

the facts of life.

Despite, this difference in explicate definition,

it is possible to combine the two positions.

It can be said that the

fulfilling fact can substantiate a promissory statement because its
order is congruent with the closing words of the statement.

For

example, the fact that the cat is on the mat can verify the statement
"John thinks that the cat is on the mat," because the order of the
terms in the fact parallel the order of the terms in the "that-clause."

25Wh't
1 e, p. 123.
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Such a combination as the one just made, does two things.

First, it

justifies William James' claim that the Pragmatic Theory of truth is a
form of the Correspondence Theory of truth.
some degree why a fact can verify an idea.

Second, it explains to
It can verify an idea because

it corresponds to it.
Pragmatism and the acceptability qualifier.

Not only does the above

combination of the Correspondence Theory and the Pragmatic Theory justify
James' assertion and explain why a fact can verify an idea, it establishes that the function fulfilling process is not the Pragmatists'
definition of truth, but their criterion for truth.

The concept of

workability, like the concept of coherence, is freed to stand as the
Pragmatists' candidate for the acceptability qualifier.
The Pragmatists' suggestion for the acceptability qualifier is
indeed to be preferred to that of the Coherence Theorists.

It is to be

preferred because it makes truth a more objective predicate.

According

to the Pragmatic Theory, truth is determined by objective facts, like,
the presence of the cat on the mat, and not the statements of some
individual's subjective system of thought.
Despite this objectivity, the Pragmatic Theory has a fault.

It

is too tied to the process of problem-solving to deal with a priori
truths as traditionally understood.

An a priori truth is not a necessary

truth, according to the Pragmatists, just a mere stipulation.
Irving Lewis expressed this thought in the following way:
The a priori represents an attitude in some sense
freely taken, a stipulation of the mind itself, and a
stipulation which might be made in some other way if it
suited our bent or need. Such truth is necessary as
opposed to contingent, not as opposed to voluntary. And
the a priori is independent of experience not because it
prescribes a form which the data of sense must fit, or

Clarence
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anticipates some preestablished harmony of experience
with the mind, but precisely because it prescribes
nothing to experience. That is a priori which is true,
no matter what. What it anticipates is not the given,
but our attitude toward it: it concerns the uncompelled
initiative of mind or, as Josiah Royce would say, our
categorical ways of acting.26
This is problematic because it makes various concepts, like the laws of
mathematics or the notion of a figure-ground relationship, a purely
arbitrary matter, and not a fact about the world.
THE NON-DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF TRUTH
The Non-Descriptive Theory of truth was developed by P. F.
Strawson as an attempt to apply J. L. Austin's conception of performative
statements

27

to the refutation of Tarski's Semantic Theory of truth, a

more precise form of the Correspondence Theory.

28

J. L. Austin,

however, did not approve of this application and attacked it in an
article entitled "Truth."

This article, as well as, one by P. F.

Strawson, became the core of a symposium on truth prepared for the
Aristotelian Society.

The initial formulation of this doctrine by Mr.

Strawson is to be found in an article entitled "Truth" which was published in 1949, the year before the symposium, in Analysis.

This article

by Mr. Strawson will serve as the major source for the following exposition of his theory.
Strawson, Performatives and Truth
Fundamental to the Non-Descriptive Theory of truth is the belief
26

clarence Irving Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori,"
Meaning and Knowledge: Systematic Readings in Epistemology, ed. Ernest
Nagel and Richard B. Brandt (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965),
p. 221.
27
28

see pages 9 and 10 of this paper.
see page 21 of this chapter.
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that truth is not a property.

In fact, Hr. Strm..rson stated it in a

more germane way in these words: "Truth is not a property of symbols;
for it is not a property.''

29

To say that truth is not a property is to

say that it is not about anything, especially statements or sentences.
It is not the name of a quality possessed by a particular group of sentences or statements.
The assertion of this belief's contradiction, i.e., the assertion
that truth is a property of sentences, results from maintaining one or
both of the following two theses:
First, any sentence beginning 'It is true that . .
does not change its assertive meaning when the phrase
'It is true that' is omitted. More generally, to say
that an assertion is true is not to make any further
assertion at all; it is to make the same assertion.
This I shall call Thesis 1.
Second, to say that a statement is true is to make
a statement about a sentence of a given language, viz.,
the language in which the first statement was made.
It is (in other and more technical terms) to make a
statement in a meta-language ascribing the semantic
property of truth (or the semantic predicate 'true')
to a sentence in an object-language. The objectsentence concerned should strictly be written in
inverted commas to make it clear that we are talking
about the sentence; and the phrase 'is true' should
strictly be followed by some such phrase as 'in L',
where 'L' designates the ob~ect-language concerned.
This I shall call Thesis 2. 0
What is being asserted in the first thesis is that the sentences, "The
cat is on the mat," and, "It is true that the cat is on the mat," say
no more than that the cat is on the mat.

What is being asserted in the

second thesis is more difficult to explain.

Fundamental to understanding

this thesis is an understanding of what is meant by the distinction

29

Peter Frederick Strawson, "Truth, 11 Meaning and Knowledge:
Systematic Readings in Epistemology, ed. Ernest Nagel and Richard B.
Brandt (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965), p. 161.
30

Strawson, pp. 160-161.
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between an object-language and a meta-language.

This distinction is

difficult to grasp, because it is not like the distinction between
Indo-European and Semitic languages.

A language cannot at one time be

an Indo-European language and at another a Semitic language.

This is

not the case with languages which can be classed as either objectlanguages or meta-languages.

It is possible, and often the case, that

the same language can at one moment be an object-language and at the
next a meta-language.

How this is possible can be seen from the defi-

nition of the term "meta-language."

A meta-language is by definition

a language used to talk about other languages.
one says, "'Das ist mein Buch,

1

For example, when some-

is a German sentence," he is saying

something in English, his meta-language, about a sentence in his objectlanguage, German.
After stating these theses, Mr. Strawson goes on to point out
their good and bad points.
Of these two theses, the first is true, but inadequate;
the second is false, but important. The first thesis is
right in what it asserts, and wrong in what it suggests.
The second thesis is wrong in what it asserts, but right
in what it implies. The first thesis is right in asserting
that to say that a statement is true is not to make a
further statement; but wrong in suggesting that to say
that a statement is true is not to do something different
from, or additional to, just making the statement. The
second thesis is right in implying that to say that a
statement is true is to do something different from just
making the statement; but wrong in asserting that this
'something different' consists in making a further statement, viz., a statement about a sentence.31
The fault with the first thesis is that it suggests that the phrase "is
true" has no purpose.

If this were the case, then there would be no

reason to attach it to other sentences.

If its being there does not

alter the meaning of the sentence, then it must have some other purpose,

31

Strawson, p. 161.
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even if only to waste words.

Even though, the distinction between

object-languages and meta-languages is valuable, it is not in this
situation that it proves its value.

Mr. Strawson claims that the problem

with the second thesis is that it ignores the context within which the
phrase "is true" is used.

It ignores the fact that the expression "is

true" is not used to describe, but to agree.
If the true elements of these two theses are combined, then the
Non-Descriptive Theory of truth is born.

According to Mr. Strawson,

to say, "It is true that the cat is on the mat," is not to assert anything about cats and mats, but to agree with an earlier speaker's
assertion that there is a cat on the mat.
with "I agree."

"Is true" becomes synonymous

Truth becomes the act of confirming.

Strawson and the Longings of Contemporary Man
Strawson's theory exhibits a greater degree of dissatisfaction
with the Correspondence Theory of truth than any of the other theories
covered.

He is not interested in maintaining, or improving, any part

of the Correspondence Theory.

Despite this fact, his writings suggest

some important things in regard to the directions of this paper.
Strawson and correspondence.

In other writings, Mr. Strawson points out

that the big problem with the Correspondence Theory is that it never
gets back to the world itself.

If Tarski's theory of correspondence is

followed, the move is from one sentence to another.

If, on the other

hand, Lord Russell is followed, the move is from a statement to a fact.
The problem here is that a fact is already a word related picture of
. lS
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If this is the case, the world

John R. Searle, "Strawson, Peter Frederick," The Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (1965), VIII, 27a-27b.
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is never touched by the test of correspondence.

This may be the very

reason why people are striving to supplement the test of correspondence
with an acceptability qualifier of some type.
Strawson and the acceptability qualifier.

In the Non-Descriptive Theory

of truth, the ascription of the expression "is true" becomes simply a
matter of fulfilling the conditions set by the acceptability qualifier,
i.e., the rules of the linguistic game of agreement.

The acceptability

qualifier becomes a term for expressing contextual propriety.

The ex-

pression "is true" can be attached to a statement if and only if it is
involved in a verbal act of agreement.
CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this chapter to establish (1) that
contemporary, Western man sees more in truth than a mere correspondence
between what is and what is said; and (2) that he is trying, without
complete success, to link to the belief that truth is the correspondence
of statements to the world, an acceptability qualifier.

The proof of

the first point is to be found evidenced in the fact that while both
the Coherence Theory and the Pragmatic Theory subscribe to the Aristotelian dictum of correspondence, i.e., "To say of what is that it is
not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is
that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true,"

33

both suggest

that more is involved with the labeling of some statement as true.

The

Coherence Theory and the Pragmatic Theory agree that this is a fine
definition of what truth is but that it is not an adequate test for what
is or is not true.

The Coherence Theory suggests that the best test for

33 T
ars k'1., p. 54 .
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truth is the coherence of statements to each other.

On the other hand,

the Pragmatic Theory suggests that the best test of a statement's truth
is to see whether or not it fulfills its function.

In either case,

more is involved in the definition and determination of truth than the
assessment of correspondence.

When the Non-Descriptive Theory is con-

sidered, it is found that the assessment of correspondence has nothing
to do with the definition and determination of truth.

In this theory,

the meaning and use of the expression "is true" is totally determined
by the rules of the linguistic game called agreement.

Both the weight

of truth's definition and determination is thrown upon the Strawsonian
conception of the acceptability qualifier.

Therefore, in the three

theories considered mere correspondence between what is and what is said
is seen as being inadequate for both the determination and definition
of truth.
The inadequacy of the definitions put forward for the acceptability qualifier establishes the second thesis, i.e., that contemporary, Western man is trying, without complete success to link with
the belief that truth is the correspondence of statements to the world,
an acceptability qualifier.

While each of the theories mentioned

defines the acceptability qualifier, their definitions involve faults
which detract from their acceptability.

Either the definition is too

subjective, too limited or too independent to be combined with correspondence.

For example, if the acceptability qualifier is understood

in terms of coherence, it becomes too subjective.

If it is considered

from the Pragmatic point of view, it is found to be too limited for
discussions of a priori truth.

If the acceptability qualifier is con-

sidered from the perspective of the Non-Descriptive Theory, it is found
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that there is no need to rely upon the Correspondence Theory at all in
the determination or definition of truth.

Therefore, it can be said,

at least in terms of the theories considered, that there has been an
effort to link with the Correspondence Theory an acceptability qualifier,
but that the effort has not been a complete success.

Chapter 3
HEIDEGGER AND HIS SOURCES
By this point, the writer believes he has established that at
the heart of the Correspondence Theory of truth is the belief that
reality or being, that is, what is, and truth are tied together.

In

order for a statement to be true in the primary sense of the term, it
must correspond to a fact, i.e., to what is.

It must be possible to

match with the statement an event in the world.
as it may seem.

This is not as simple

In fact, it has been suggested that it cannot be done.

One person to have suggested this is P. F. Strawson.

1

According to Mr. Strawson, the problem with the Correspondence
Theory of truth is that it falsely equates facts with events in the
world.

The difficulty here is that facts and events are not the same

thing.

Unlike an event, a fact is a word related picture of the world:

it is not reality itself.

2

A fact can be distinguished from an event,

from reality itself, in that facts, "unlike events, situations, states
of affairs, or objects, have no date or location."

3

Hhere the cat may

be on the mat now and gone in an hour, the fact that the cat was on the
mat is timeless.

Similarly, facts are not normally to be found reclining

on mats.
1

See pages 34 and 35 of this paper.

2

John R. Searle, "Strawson, Peter Frederick," The
of Philosophy (1965), VIII, 27a-27b.

E~cyclopedia

3
Alan R. White, Truth (Anchor Books ed.; Garden City: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1970), p. 80.
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This false equation of facts with reality is problematic,
because the type of correspondence required by the Correspondence
Theory of truth is that of a statement's semi-parallelism with a fact.

4

This being the case, truth is robbed of any direct connection to reality.
The statement, "It is true that the cat is on the mat," is verified
through comparing it with a fact, not reality.
every tie to reality then lost?"

No.

It may be asked, "Is

Reality is considered the

criterion for determining whether or not something is a fact.

There-

fore, truth does not have a direct, but a mediated tie to reality.
According to the traditional formulation of the Correspondence Theory,
facts bridge the gap between truths and events.
This is not an altogether happy situation, because it evades the
real issue.

It leads people into falsely thinking that they understand

what it is for a true statement to correspond to reality, when they do
not.

This approach to the problem explains what it is for a statement

to correspond to a fact, but leaves untouched the problem of what it
is for a fact to correspond to the world.

The nature of the correspon-

dence between true statements and the world is not completely described.

HEIDEGGER AND TRUTH
It is from this unhappy situation that Martin Heidegger sought
and found escape.

This escape required a reformulating of the Corre-

spondence Theory of truth.

His best presentation of this reformulated

doctrine, which will now be called the Heideggerian Theory of truth, is
to be found in "On the Essence of Truth."

4

see pages 19 and 20 of this paper.

This reformulation is
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accomplished in two phases.

The first phase involves the redetermi-

nation of what is the primary sense of truth.

The second phase of this

reformulation requires the elucidation of the early Greek conception of
aletheia.
A Switch in Primacy
It was earlier stated that truth has two senses.
agrees with this point.

5

Dr. Heidegger

Even though he agrees that truth has two

senses, he disagrees with the earlier determination of which sense is
primary.

It was determined earlier that the primary sense of truth had

to deal with statements, and not objects.

Prof. Heidegger considers

the reverse to be the case.
Not only did Martin Heidegger switch the determination of
primacy, he gave more descriptive names to the two classes of things
which can be called true.

To the first class of truths, that is, the

things that are said, Prof. Heidegger gave the very appropriate name
"propositional truths."

6

He probably called them propositional truths,

because their truth is dependent upon the propositions they express.
The second class of truth he referred to as "material truths. ,.7

This

is very appropriate terminology to use in regards to the objects that
populate the world.
Employing this new terminology, it is discovered that Heidegger
would prefer to consider material truth as primary, and not secondary.

5

See pages 8 and 9 of this paper.

6
Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth", trans. John Sallis,
Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), pp. 119 ff.
7
Heidegger, pp. 119 ff.
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This stands in opposition to the earlier stance taken in this paper.

At

that point, the propositional sense of truth was considered primary.
Dr. Martin Heidegger generates two reasons for making this change.
The first of these deals with the scope of propositional truth.

The

second reason is rooted in the traditional definition of truth: "veritas
est adequatio rei et intellectus [Truth is the adequation of matter and
intellect.]."

8

It is not reasonable to assume that propositional truth is the
primary sense of truth, because it presupposes material truth.

If a

statement is to be prepositionally true, it must first be materially true.
A statement cannot be true, unless it is correctly stated: It cannot be
prepositionally true, unless it meets the standards for being a proper
statement.

For example, "Four greens quickly," cannot be prepositionally

true, because it does not meet the criteria for being a statement.

The

words, "Four greens quickly," cannot be prepositionally true, because it
is not materially adequate.

It is just an interesting collection of

words, and not a statement.

It says nothing.

A second reason for making this switch is to be found in the
traditional definition of truth.

From the middle ages forward, truth has

been generally defined as the adequation of matter and intellect.
Accordingly, if one wants to check the truth of one of his ideas, he must
compare it with the objects of his world.

But, if this checking is to

avo1d the falsehood brought by illusion, then it!Tlust be first
whether or not the objects in question are materially true.

determin..,eci!d~~~-

To determine

the truth of the statement, "There is a bent stick in the water," one
must first determine if the stick is a real stick.

Therefore, one must

first determine the material truths involved before he can determine the
status of the proposition in question.

8

Heidegger, p. 120.
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Heidegger on Aletheia
There are three things which have a great bearing upon Heidegger's
understanding of aletheia.
drew the concept.

The first thing is the source from which he

The second is the term, "letting be."

The last item

is his understanding of freedom.
Heidegger, in formulating his understanding of aletheia, drew primarily from three Greek philosophers.
Aristotle.

The first of these philosophers is

Heidegger found a great deal of material concerning this sub-

ject in Aristotle's interpretation of aletheuein in the Nicomachean
Ethics, "which analyzed the many ways of relating to 'truth,' that is,
ways of letting beings show themselves as they are in their Being."

9

The

second Greek philosopher to serve as a source for Heidegger's musing
about aletheia is Plato.

The role that Plato's thought played in

Heidegger's musings concerning truth can be found reflected in the article
entitled, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth."
Heraclitus.
the three.

Last, but by no means least, is

In fact, Heraclitus can be considered the most important of
Heraclitus can be considered the most important because it

was fragment B 16 of Heraclitus' works which served as the text for
10
Heidegger's article "Aletheia."
Even though aletheia is normally translated as truth, Heidegger
found that the above mentioned Greeks used it in a little different way.
For these Greeks, aletheia was not what corresponded, but what was
disclosed.

Therefore, Heidegger has chosen to translate aletheia as

"disclosure" or "unconcealment."

11

Aletheia, or truth, is predicated

of something, when it serves to disclose what is.

9

navid Farrell Krell, ed., Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), p. 14.
10

Krell, p. 396.

llH e~"d egger, p. 127 .
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One thing that allows this disclosing of the world to come
about is described in the term "letting be."

Heidegger uses this term

in a sense quite different from the normal use.
Ordinarily we speak of letting be whenever, for
example, we forgo some enterprise that has been planned.
"We let something be" means we do not touch it again,
we have nothing more to do with it. To let something
be has here the negative sense of letting it alone, of
renouncing it, of indifference and even neglect.12
If the world is to be disclosed, it must not be neglected.

Anyone

interested in disclosing the world must engage himself in the world.
However, the phrase required now--to let beings
be--does not refer to neglect and indifference but
rather the opposite. To let be is to engage oneself
with beings. On the other hand, to be sure, this is
not to be understood only as the mere management, preservation, tending, and planning of the beings in each
case encountered or sought out. To let be--that is, to
let beings be as the beings which they are--means to
engage oneself with the open region and its openness,
as it were, along with itself. Western thinking in its
beginning conceived this open region as ta aletheia, the
unconcealed. If we translate al~theia as "unconcealment"
rather than "truth," this translation is notmerely more
literal; it contains the directive to rethink the ordinary concept of truth in the sense of the correctness of
statements and to think it back to that still uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings. To
engage oneself with the disclosedness of beings is not
to lose oneself in them; rather, such engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might
reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are
and in order that presentative correspondence might take
its standard from them.l3
When one engages the world, for the sake of disclosing it, he must not
engage it with a mind to alter it, to change it, but with a mind to
leave it as it is.

He must leave it as it is, so that it can conform

to the material standards of truth applicable to it.

"Letting be,"

then, is not an altering of being, but an assisting of being in its

12

He1'd egger, p. 127 .

13

Heidegger, pp. 127-128.
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self-realization.

It is the process of bringing being into being.

Freedom is the last item of importance in considering the
Heideggerian conception of aletheia.
condition for aletheia.

Freedom can be called a pre-

For Heidegger, freedom is not just the mere

absence of chains and bars, it is engagement itself.

Heidegger ex-

pressed it in this way:
Freedom is not merely what common sense is content
to let pass under this name: the caprice, turning up
occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or
that direction. Freedom is not mere absence of constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor
is it on the other hand mere readiness for what is
required and necessary (and so somehow a being). Prior
to all this ("negative" and "positive" freedom), free14
dom is engagement in the disclosure of beings as such.
The type of freedom which is of interest to Heidegger is not the freedom
of mere engagement, but the kind of freedom which can be characterized
as letting things be.

Understood in this way, freedom is what brings

truth into being.
In summation, Heidegger understands aletheia, truth, to be the
disclosure of the world that results from engaging the world in such a
way that it can be what it is.

The Heideggerian Theory of Truth
Having discussed the Heideggerian switch and the Heideggerian

conception of aletheia, it is possible to formu:hrt-e-----r:he Heideggerian
Theory of truth.

In brief, a statement is true when it allows something

to be materially true.

A statement is considered to be true when it

serves as a cause for a being's revelation.

The statement, "The cat

is on the mat," is judged as true, when it serves to reveal an unknovm
aspect of the eat's way of living, that is, when it reveals a mode of

14

He1"d egger, p. 128 .
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the eat's existence.
It can be objected that this theory of truth robs true propositions of their timelessness.

This is really not the case.

What has

been said above must be considered as a description of what happens
when a statement becomes true.

As the years pass, there is no reason

to require that what has been revealed go back into hiding, even though
this often happens.

It is important to note that the importance of the

revelation may decline as time passes.
things, of becoming common place.

Facts have a habit, like most

For example, how many people are

surprised when the lights go on?
Heidegger and this Paper
Heidegger's work in the area of truth is of importance to the
development of this paper for two reasons.

The first reason is that he

presents us with a radical transformation of the Correspondence Theory.
The second reason is that he suggests a new tack which can be taken in
the definition of the acceptability qualifier.
While still holding that truth is correspondence, Martin
Heidegger brings about a radical transformation of the Correspondence
Theory of truth.
things.

He brought about this transformation in doing two

First, he established that contemporary man had erred in his

determination of which class of truths are really primary.

He deter-

mined that material truths should be considered primary, and not propositional truths.

The second thing he did was to reject the notion that

correspondence consisted in a semi-parallelism of statements and facts.
He rejected the notion that the correspondence lies between statements
and the world.
Theory of truth.

For Heidegger, statements are like ideas in the Pragmatic
Both statements and ideas are functional elements in
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the discovery of truth.

Both are goal directed and validated terms.

In both cases, the truth of a statement or idea depends upon its
ability to bring about a desired end.
the solution of a problem.
understanding of what is.

In the case of ideas, the end is

In the case of statements, the end is an
According to Heidegger the correspondence

lies between objects and the standard for their existence.
The second reason that Heidegger is important to the development
of this paper is that he offers a new direction which can be taken in
the definition of the acceptability qualifier.

What he suggests is

that the real criteria for truth should be found in the standards for
material truth.
are.

Unfortunately, he fails to define what these standards

It is hoped that further examination in this area will yield the

definition Heidegger missed.

HEIDEGGER'S SOURCES
In the previous section, the Heideggerian Theory of truth was
discussed.
plete.

It was discovered to be truly revolutionary, but yet incom-

While suggesting a new direction which can be taken in the

definition of the acceptability qualifier, it fails to follow through
with a formulation of this definition.

What this theory suggests is

that the real criteria for truth is to be found in the standards for
material truth.

Unfortunately, the Heideggerian Theory fails to define

what these standards are: It fails to define the acceptability qualifier.
After noting this limitation of the Heideggerian Theory, the
hope was expressed that further examination in this area would yield the
definition that the Heideggerian Theory lacks.
examination to start?

Where is this further

Probably, the best place for it to start is

where Heidegger himself started.

Consequently, the refining of this
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theory will begin with an examination of the Greek philosophers from
which Heidegger derived his theory.
In his theorizing about truth, Heidegger drew primarily from the
works of Aristotle, Plato and the Presocratics.

The first two of these

thinkers, that is, Aristotle and Plato, can be considered together.

The

Presocratics, on the other hand, must be considered separately from
both Aristotle and Plato.
Aristotle and his teacher, Plato, can be considered together,
because they stand in opposition to the modes of Presocratic thought.
Prior to Socrates, it was unity, and not difference, which characterized
the thoughts of the Greek philosophers.
socratics

When, for example, the Pre-

thought about Being, they strove to maintain the identity,

the sameness of such concepts, as Being and Becoming, reality and
appearance.

This is why people attribute to Thales, the "initiator of

Greek philosophy"

15

, the view that all things are one.

16

This situation

was altered when Plato introduced the notion of ideal forms--unseen,
quasi-spiritual entities--which he equated with Being.

17

As a result of

this Platonic innovation, a gulf arose in philosophical thought between
reality and appearance.

Therefore, Plato is the point of demarcation

for two philosophic traditions, i.e., the Presocratic and the Western
metaphysical traditions.

15

Frederick Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy (Image
Books Edition; Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), Vol. I,
Part I, p. 40.
16
17

Copleston, Vol. I, Part I, p. 93.

J. L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), pp. 147-149.
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Plato and Aristotle
The emergence of this gulf between reality and appearance
brought a change in the conception of truth for the entire Western metaphysical tradition.

Not only did it bring a change in the Platonic

conception of truth, it also generated a new notion of truth which has
been employed in the thinking of Western philosophers since the time of
Plato.

This means that Aristotle, though differing in many ways from

Plato, employed generally the same notion of truth that Plato did.
According to Heidegger, the emergence of this gulf transformed
truth from being a matter of unhiddenness to a matter of perceptual
correctness, "from a-letheia to orthotes."

18

To characterize truth as

"orthotes", i.e., correctness, accomplishes something very interesting.
It makes it possible to declare that the primary sense of truth is
propositional.

This is the case because truth becomes a matter of the

correctness of a perceptually oriented proposition, and not a matter of
some objects faithfulness to its essence.

When truth is characterized

as "orthotes", then it does not matter if it is characteristic of cats
to bark.

All that matters is whether or not some cat has been heard

barking.

If some cat has been heard barking, then it is true to say

that the cat was barking.
---------vvwll-Mt-1'la~t'-~'l'h'taMs'l-1bmeen

said thus far about truth

charaeterh:ecl-a-s--f'CT'IO"~"t"~"t~ecf"C~t-------

ness applies equally well to both Plato and the Western metaphysical
tradition that he spawned.

However, Plato's theory of truth did possess

a feature which makes it unique.

While opening the door to the idea

that truth is primarily propositional in character, he did not move
from the belief that truth is primarily material in character.

18

Mehta, p. 149.

He did
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not follow his thoughts to their ultimate conclusion.

The reason that

he did not follow his thoughts to their natural conclusion was that he
was preoccupied with the analysis of absolute truth.
In the Republic, especially those sections in which Plato presents the analogy of the Line and the allegory of the Cave, Plato
declares that there are two kinds of truth, or knowledge.
category opinion and the other, knowledge.

He calls one

It is only in the category

called knowledge that Plato claims that real and infallible truth can
be found.

Most people would argue that there are truths to be found

among man's opinions.

Having mentioned that Plato believes that truth

is ultimately only to be found in the category labeled knowledge, it
becomes necessary to delimit what he means to include in that category.
Plato uses the term "knowledge" to refer to information about ideal
forms, or what are now termed universals.

On the other hand, Plato uses

the term "opinion" to describe statements about appearances, about particulars.

Statements about goodness would be categorized as knowledge

bearing, because goodness is one of the Platonic ideal forms.

The

statement, "The cat is on the mat", would be a matter of opinion, because
it deals with particulars.

For Plato, true knowledge can only be

possessed concerning the world of ideal forms.
Before going in further, it must be understood that Heidegger
rejected both the general notion of truth as correctness and Plato's
particular formulation of that notion.

Many reasons can be put forward

for why Heidegger would want to reject this notion.

The first reason

is that it demands a distinction between reality and appearance.
Heidegger makes abundantly clear in Being and Time that reality and
appearance are one.

In this work, he equates reality with essence and
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then proceeds to establish a method for determining essential in a given
series of some being's appearances.

He argues that a being's essence

is the common residue of that being's appearances.

If, for example, a

pyramid is described from a number of different vantage points and those
descriptions are compared, what is found is that it is consistently
described as a figure having at least two dimensions.

This is found to

be what Heidegger would call the essence, or reality, or being, of a
pyramid.

Therefore, because Heidegger views reality as a subset of all

possible appearance, and not a separate category of existence, it would
be impossible for him to support this Platonic based conception of truth
as correctness.
A second reason why Heidegger rejected this notion of truth can
be found in the fact that it opens the door to the declaration that the
primary sense of truth is propositional.

Dr. Heidegger makes it clear

in "On the Essence of Truth" that he believes the primary sense of
truth to be material truth.
reasons.

19

He put forward this position for two

The first reason is that a statement cannot be true proposi-

tionally, unless it is a proper statement.

20

For example, "Four greens

quickly" cannot be prepositionally true, because it does not meet the
criteria for being a statement.
nothing.

The words, "Four greens quickly", say

The second reason was that the primacy of material truth is

indicated by the traditional definition of truth: "veritas est adequatio
[Truth is the adequation of matter and intellect]."

19

21

According to this

Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth", trans. John Sallis,
Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), pp. 119 ff.

20

see page 41 of this paper.

21 H .d
e1 egger, p. 120 .
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definition, a statement's truth is based on its acceptable description
of what is already materially true.

This is a situation that is not

always recognized by individuals subscribing to the traditional definition of truth.

Therefore, considering Dr. Heidegger's rejection of the

primacy of propositional truth for the above reasons, it would be unfair to expect him to support a theory that entailed the primacy of
propositional truth.
The last reason Prof. Heidegger would have for rejecting the
notion of truth as correctness is that it is closely tied to the spirit
of Nihilism.

This conception of truth is the result of the generation

of a gulf between reality and appearance.

Heidegger claims that this

step is the first move in mode of thought that finds its logical fulfillment in the Nihilism of Nietzsche.

22

By this claim Heidegger means

to suggest that Plato began the trend for Western thinkers to reject
and rebel against their culture, instead of thinking through their
culture.

Nietzsche's exhortation to the effect that one should generate

his own morals can be considered the flowering of this rebellious trend.
It can be considered the flowering of Nihilism, because it tells the
rebel what he can do once the traditional norms have been rejected.
It tells the rebel that he can make up his own rules.

On the other

hand, the rather conservative Prof. Heidegger would prefer it, if a
thinker would simply think through--discover what was intended in the
thoughts of his ancestors.
The Presocratics
Desiring to turn from the rebelliousness of Plato and the
Western metaphysical tradition, Prof. Heidegger turned to Plato's

22

Mehta, pp. 126-127.
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intellectual ancestors for direction.

It was to Presocratic philosophy,

especially the writings of Heraclitus, that he turned.
The most important portion of Heraclitus' works for the formulation of the Heideggerian Theory of truth is fragment B 16: "How
could anyone escape the notice of that which never sets?"

23

This

fragment serves as the text upon which Heidegger based his article entitled "Aletheia."

24

This statement is very elusive and seems to say

little, if anything, about truth.

The one thing that it seems to

suggest is that what is true is obvious because it is always present
with us.

What is true is that which is not hidden.

This statement,

while encapsulating the Heideggerian Theory, does not throw any light
on the standard for material truth.

This fragment does not aid in the

solution of the problem set for this chapter, that is, the determination of the criteria for material truth.

Since, this is the only state-

ment in the works of Heraclitus dealing with truth, it can be stated
that Heraclitus does not provide an answer to the question of what the
standard for material truth is.

This is also the case with the other

Presocratics.
The Greeks Reconsidered
The hope that a turn to the Heideggerian sources would provide
a detailing of the standard for material truth has proven fruitless.
Neither the Platonic tradition nor the Presocratic thinkers have been
of any help.

In the investigation of Plato it was found that any

23

John Mansley Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), p. 103.
24

David Farrell Krell, ed., Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), p. 396.
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positive contribution that Plato could have made would have been at
odds with Heideggerian metaphysics.

It would have been at odds with

Heidegger's metaphysics, because it divorced reality from appearance,
"Being" from "Becoming."

Even though, Heidegger and the Presocratics

shared the belief in the identity of "Being" and "Becoming," the
Presocratic writings were of no help in determining the standard for
material truth.

Therefore, if the hoped for solution to this problem

is to come, it can now be clearly seen that it must come from a different
quarter.

Chapter 4
A PARALLEL TRADITION: THE BIBLE
Despite the fact that the Heideggerian sources did not provide
the hoped for standard for material truth, one need not give up the
hope that it can be found.

In fact, there is a parallel tradition that

appears to provide the solution.

This parallel tradition finds its

literary expression in the Bible.

This tradition can be called the

Hebraic tradition or the Biblical tradition.
THE GORDON THESIS
One might object that the Biblical or Hebraic tradition does not
parallel the Greek intellectual tradition.

It could be objected that

one is Semitic, and that the other is Indo-European.

Or, it could be

objected that one is prophetic, and that the other is philosophical.
The Hebraic culture is clearly Semitic and prophetic in character, and
not in the least Indo-European and philosophical.

On the other hand,

the intellectual development of the Greeks can be characterized as
Indo-European and philosophical.

Clearly a gulf exists between the

Hebraic and the Greek traditions.
Cyrus H. Gordon contends that, despite these differences,
"Greek and Hebrew civilizations are parallel structures built upon the
same East Nediterranean foundation."

1

1

By this he means that both

Cyrus H. Gordon, The Common Background of Greek and Hebrew
Civilizations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1965), p. 9.
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civilizations were generated from the same foundation and that each
built upon that foundation.

Both the Greeks and the Hebrews took from

the culture that spawned them.

In doing this, they generated divergent,

yet parallel, civilizations.
This thesis was put forward by Prof. Gordon in an attempt to
answer the question, "Why are there so many parallels between the Bible
and Homer's poetry?"

This question arose as a result of the discovery

of significant parallels between the Bible and Homer.

Among the many

parallels which generated this question are the functional equivalence
of the Greek aegis and the Hebrew Staff of God,

2

and the use of triads

. cata 1 ogues. 3
1n

In addition to the various parallels, what evidence can be
advanced in support of the contention that Greek and Hebrew civilizations are parallel structures.
other types of evidence.
an analysis of East

To these parallels Dr. Gordon adds two

First, Mr. Gordon supports his thesis through

~fediterranean

analysis of the Levantine.

urban society, i.e., through an

Secondly, he strengthens his position by

tracing the development of Minoan civilization.

The Minoan civiliza-

tion was the foundation upon which the Greeks built their culture.
When one understands the urban structure common in the eastern
Mediterranean in and around the Amarna Age, he begins to see the potential for cross-cultural fertilization in this area.

During this and

earlier ages, the cities of the eastern Mediterranean were great
commercial centers where people--merchants, soldiers and diplomats-gathered from many lands.

The cities were a sort of melting pot.

This

particular form or style of melting pot is termed a Levantine pattern.

2

Gordon, pp. 12-13.

3

Gordon, pp. 16-17.
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The Levantine pattern is the mingling of distinct
communities side by side. If we contrast a Levantine
city (such as Istanbul, Beirut or Alexandria) with an
American city (such as New York or Boston), the difference between the Near East Levant and the American
melting pot will become clear. The minorities in the
Levant maintain their individuality for centuries, and
even millennia, whereas the norm in an American metropolis is assimilation.4
In a Levant, instead of forming one culture, the groups are allowed to
intermingle and pollenate each other, while maintaining their own
tinctives.

dis-

In an environment like this it becomes very easy for an

individual or a group to become familiar with another culture.

This

potentiality supports Dr. Gordon's thesis in that it establishes a
method for cross-cultural fertilization that does not require the
merging of the cultures involved.

It allows the cultures to form in

parallel structures as opposed to one tremendous monolithe.
Dr. Gordon's analysis of Minoan history serves as the real
support of his thesis.
on two things.

His analysis of Minoan history is based primarily

The first is his discovery that the earliest Minoan in-

scriptions are written in a Semitic language.

5

The second item upon

which his history is based is the fact that the early Twelfth Dynasty
Pharaohs overthrew the foreigners of the Delta.

6

Dr. Gordon suggests

that this conflict resulted in the mass exodus of Semites from the Nile
Delta.

It would be at this time that the Hebrews moved into the land of

Canaan.

Mr. Gordon suggests that Semites also moved during this period

to the islands of Crete.

In these islands the Semites set up what is

now called the Minoan Culture.

The fact that the Minoan culture is

Semitic in origin is born out by the nature of the Minoan language.

4

Gordon, pp. 30-31.

5

Gordon, pp. 206-217.

6

Gordon, p. 7.

Dr.

57
Cyrus Gordon has established that the lingua franca of the Minoan
civilization is Semitic.

With the lingua franca of the Minoan culture

being Semitic, it is only natural to assume that the major population
group of this culture was Semitic and, quite possibly, from the Nile
Delta.

It might be objected that the islands of Crete are a little too

far from Egypt for any major migration.

In response to this objection,

it can be stated that Prof. Fell of Harvard has discovered inscriptions
which suggest that both Egyptians and Semites had colonized North
America some 2500 years ago. 7
known for a long time.

The remainder of Minoan history has been

During the close of the second millennia, Greek

speaking Indo-Europeans invaded the islands of Crete.

And, like the

Romans who in turn invaded Greece, these Indo-Europeans adopted the
culture of the Minoans.

It would then be as a result of this merging of

the Greek and Minoan cultures that Homer would have become familiar
with the Semitic world.
Therefore, considering the data just presented, it is reasonable
to say that both the Greek and the Hebrew cultures are parallel structures built upon the same foundation.

It now seems clear that both the

Greek and the Hebraic traditions were spawned in Egypt and that both
cultures followed divergent, yet parallel, courses of development.

With

this being the case, the Hebraic tradition would then be an excellent
place to turn to find a theory of truth similar to the early Greek
theory, and to, also, find a determination of the standard for material
truth.

7
Barry Fell, America B. C. (New York: Quadrangle/The New York
Times Book Co., 1976).
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THE BIBLE, THE GREEKS AND TRUTH
The Bible is the chief expression of the Hebraic tradition and,
as such, the best place to look for material on the Hebraic notion of
truth.

One might object that the Bible is not the best place to turn,

because it represents two different traditions, i.e., the Jewish and the
Christian.

It is true that the Bible contains material sacred to both

of these faiths, but it is wrong to suggest that they are completely
distinct traditions.

The Christian faith is no more than the fulfillment

of the first stages of the Hebraic tradition.

This fulfillment is the

result of the arrival of the promised Messiah, Jesus Christ.

Christ

revolutionized--but did not abandon--the Hebraic tradition by doing two
things.

First, he pushed through to the essence of the tradition in his

teachings.

Secondly, he brought reconciliation with God, the goal of

the Hebraic tradition, through his death and resurrection.
Even though truth is conceived in essentially the same \vay
through out the Bible, there are some differences between the presentations of the Old Testament and the New Testament.
expresses a much fuller understanding of truth.

The New Testament
In the Old Testament,

as well as the New Testament, truth is discussed in a number of different
connections.

The Old Testament conception of truth finds its expression

in the usage of the Hebrew word

11

>emeth. 11

three different ways in the Old Testament.

11

,)emeth 11 is used in primarily
It is considered from the

perspectives of epistemology, law and religion.

8

11

Aletheia 11 is the
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Greek term used to signify the New Testament conception of truth.
Rudolf Bultmann points out in the Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament that "aletheia" is used in six different ways.

He suggests

that it is used for that which has the force of certainty; for that upon
which a person can rely; for that which is disclosed in experience; for
that which is a true statement; for that which is a true doctrine; or
. h lS
. genu1ne.
.
9
f or t h at wh lC

From the perspective of epistemology, the Old Testament teaches
that the word ")emeth" describes a firm, binding reality.
a world with which one interacts.

10

It describes

It suggests, as did Heidegger and the

Presocratics, that a precondition for truth is engagement with the
world.

It also indicates that truth is ultimately grounded in reality.

Here is found the suggestion that truth involves both the individual's
encounter with the world and the primacy of material truth.
It is in the New Testament that the last parallel is found
which allows for the identification in essential respects between the
Hebraic and the Heideggerian/Presocratic conceptions of truth.

This

last parallel is tied to one of the six points mentioned above in Bultmann's description of aletheia's use in the New Testament.

Within the

Bible, the Heideggerian corpus and the Presocratic literature, the term
aletheia denotes non-concealment, disclosure.

All these sources indi-

cate that material truth is rooted in the disclosure of the world that
results from engaging the world in such a way that it can be what it is.
With material truth defined in this way, it is then possible to say with

9

10

Quell, Kittel and Bultmann, 242-247.
Quell, Kittel and Bultmann, 232-233.
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Heidegger that a statement is prepositionally true when it allows
something to be materially true.

The statement, "The cat is on the

mat," is determined to be true, when it serves to disclose some unknown
aspect of the eat's way of living, that is, when it unveils a mode of
the eat's existence.
Bultmann relies heavily on the first chapter of Romans to
support his thesis that aletheia is sometimes employed in the Bible to
denote non-concealment, disclosure.

He considers the key verses for his

argument to be verses 18, 19 and 25.

He understands these verses to be

speaking of God as a "revealed reality."

11

He finds additional support

in Acts 4:27, Colossians 1:6 and numerous places in John.

12

The parallel between the New Testament and the Heideggerian conceptions of truth extends beyond the level of material truth.

The New

Testament also views propositional truth in a functional way.

Paul's

defense of his gospel in I Corinthians suggests a functional view of
language.

The passage states that Paul wants to be judged in terms of

the success of his proclamation.

A functional view of language and

.
1 v1ew
.
. .
1 trut h . 13
.
preac h 1ng
suggests a f unctlona
o f propos1t1ona

Having made these identifications, it is now proper to ask if
the Bible can answer the question Heidegger and the Presocratics could
not.
truth.

It is time to see if the Bible suggests a standard for material
It is now time to see if the Bible suggests a method for deter-

mining whether or not a given disclosure presents some facet of the

11

12
13

Quell, Kittel and Bultmann, 243.
Quell, Kittel and Bultmann, 243.

That Paul did indeed view propositional truth from a functional perspective will be established in the later treatment of I
Thessalonians 2.
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world as it is.
At this point in the investigation, the writer was most fortunate to come across I Thessalonians 2.

This passage was important for

what it suggested, and not what it actually said.

While these verses

did not define the acceptability qualifier, they did suggest a course of
study which led to its definition.
I Thessalonians 2 is a defense of Paul's ministry.

The Pauline

defense parallels the Heideggerian Theory of truth and suggests a new
direction for the investigation.

The Revised Standard Version of the

Bible renders this passage in the following words:
For you yourselves know, brethern, that our visit to
you was not in vain; 2 but though we had already suffered
and been shamefully treated at Philippi, as you know, we
had courage in our God to declare to you the gospel of
God in the face of great opposition. 3 For our appeal
does not spring from error or uncleanness, nor is it made
with guile; 4 but just as we have been approved by God
to be entrusted with the gospel, so we speak, not to
please men, but to please God who tests our hearts.
5 For we never used either words of flattery, as you
know, or a cloak for greed, as God is witness; 6 nor did
we seek glory from men, whether from you or from others,
though we might have made demands as apostles of Christ.
7 But we were gentle among you, like a nurse taking care
of her children. 8 So, being affectionately desirous of
you, we were ready to share with you not only the gospel
of God but also our own selves, because you had become
very dear to us.l4
This passage's most important portion is verse three: "For our

appeal does not spring from error or uncleanne-ss-;-nor is it made with
guile."

15

From the context, it is clear that, in this verse, Paul is

asserting the veracity, the truth, of his teachings.
assertion Paul combines three concepts.

14
15

r Thessalonians 2:1-8 (RSV).
I Thessalonians 2:3 (RSV).

In making this

These concepts are error,
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uncleanness and guile.

The last of these concepts "guile" can be

omitted from our discussion, because it is clearly a reference to moral,
and not epistemological truth.

The other two terms have a more epis-

temological character and will, therefore, be studied.
Breaking with the understanding represented in the King James
Version of the Bible, the Revised Standard Version rendered the Greek
word "planes" by the English word "error."
it is translated by the word "deceit."

In the King James Version,

The Revised Standard Version's

translation is to be preferred, because the term "deceit" does not
accurately represent what is expressed in the Greek word "planes."

This

word refers to what misleads or causes one to wander from what is at
hand.

It is understood by analogy with the straying of sheep.

Under-

stood in this way, planes reflects not only the moral truth suggested by
deceit, but also epistemological truth.

Therefore, the more neutral

term "error" is to be preferred.
When planes is understood in its more primordial sense, as that
which misleads or causes one to wander astray, it can be said to allude
to the nature of propositional truth.

It appears to be an employment of

the notion of propositional truth conceived of as an instrument for
bringing about the disclosure of some item.

Paul seems to be saying

that his statements have not been turning people away from experiencing

------

Christ as he truly is, but have been pointing to him.

In fact, Paul

elsewhere claims to be directing people to Christ and to him crucified.
In this passage, Paul appears to be using the same conception of truth
attributed to Heidegger and found elsewhere in the Bible.
The use of uncleanness in the analysis of epistemological truth

16

I Corinthians 2:2.

16
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seems incongruent.

Discussions of cleanness seem more appropriate in

the field of moral science; however, it also has a place in epistemology.
The biblical term "clean" and its opposite "unclean" can operate in both
spheres of thought, because they are used to denote various states of
acceptability which are determined by the same basic criteria in both the
fields of ethics and epistemology.

The point that the term "clean" is

used to denote a state of acceptability should be fairly obvious.
something is clean, it is acceptable.

When

For example, when a Jew declares

a ham steak to be unclean, he does not mean that it has dirt on it but
that it is not an acceptable food stuff.

The second point, i.e., that

ethics and epistemology both employ the same basic criteria for acceptability, is not as easy to see and will require an exposition of the
biblical conception of cleanness.
Before pressing further, the exact relationship between the
term "clean" and its standard--which will later be employed as the
acceptability qualifier in virtually all areas of truth--must be explained.
able.

"Clean" is a label for what has been determined to be accept-

Its standard is the test for acceptability.

If something meets

the standard, then it is labeled clean or acceptable.
to the act of labeling a piece of meat prime.

This is similar

When the meat passes

inspection, that is, meets the criteria, then it is graded prime.

The

label "clean" and its standard are related as elements in a testing or
grading process.
What test does the Bible suggest for cleanness?

If one concen-

trates on the Old Testament, the Law stands out as the standard.

If,

for example, one wants to know about a given meat's acceptability, all
he needs to do is see what is said in the Law.

After reading Leviticus
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11:5, the individual would know that a piece of coney is unclean.

In

the Old Testament, the Law appears to be the final standard for cleanness.
The use of the Law as the standard for cleanness, may be fine in
the area of morality, but not in the area of epistemology.
cially useless in the determination of material truth.

It is espe-

Where, for

example, the Law informs one about the moral status of the coney, it
gives very little information about the material status of the coney.
On the basis of the Law one cannot distinguish between a hare and a
coney.

They are both described as not being clovenfooted, cud chewers.
Some German scholars suggest that another standard for cleanness

in the Old Testament is an item's proximity to something of great supernatural power.

17

If something has recently been close or is now close

to a fearful power, then it is considered unclean.

These scholars

suggest that it is this conception of uncleanness that led to both the
early Greek and Hebrew declarations that sex was unclean.

Sex was

labeled unclean, because fearful powers were viewed as taking part in
sexual activity.
This notion of cleanness is also of little help in this investigation.

It makes any assessment of cleanness, of acceptability, a very

transitory judgment.
is not.

At one moment, it is; and, at the next moment, it

When one seeks for truth, especially epistemological truth,

one wants something that is lasting.

With this being the case, it is

only natural to assume that the same individual would want to work with

and F.

65

a fairly permanent standard for acceptability.

Therefore, if a stan-

dard for cleanness, like the one above, is going to be highly transitory,
then it will not be suitable for the determination of epistemological
truth.
When the essence of the Hebraic tradition is revealed in the
New Testament, the actual standard for cleanness is found to be quite
different from what it appeared to be in the Old Testament.

The New

Testament declares that cleanness is determined by an act of God.

It

is taught that it is not someone's or something's adherence to the Law
that counts, but what God has done to him or it.

It is not proximity

to a fearful power that determines someone's or something's cleanness,
but an act of God.
A very enlightening passage in the New Testament on the relationship between cleanness and the acts of God is to be found in the
lOth chapter of Acts.
vision Peter had.

In verses 9-16 of this chapter is recorded a

In this vision a sheet was lowered from heaven con-

taining various of unclean animals.

After the lowering of the sheet,

the following conversation transpired.
13 And there came a voice to him, "Rise, Peter; kill
and eat." 14 But Peter said, "No, Lord; for I have
never eaten anything that is common or unclean." 15 And
the voice came to him again a second time, "What God has
cleansed, you must not call common."l8
Because of this vision's importance and Peter's slowness, God repeated
this scene two more times.
This vision was given to teach the very important point that
cleanness is a result of God's actions.
formed by God is cleanness dependent?

18

Acts 10:13-15 (RSV).

Upon what kind of action perVerse 15 suggests that it is the
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result of God cleansing something.
vestigation forward.
is clean.

To say this does not push the in-

Of course, when something has been cleansed, it

To say this is to express an utterly trivial tautology.

If

this investigation is to progress any further, then God's act of
cleansing must be described in a non-tautological fashion.
Just such a description is to be found in the conception of a
new creation.

It may be objected that cleanness and creation are com-

pletely unrelated concepts, but this is not the case.

It is in Galatians

6:15 that Paul establishes the connection between these concepts.

In

this verse Paul contrasts the notion of cleanness as resulting from an
act of God with the apparent Old Testament notion that cleanness is tied
either to someone's or something's adherence to the Law or to its
proximity to some fearful force.

In this passage he represents the

apparent Old Testament view by the terms "circumcision" and "uncircumcision."

He represents the view that cleanness results from God's

action with the New Testament conception of a new creation.

Asserting

the superiority of the New Testament view, Paul says, "For neither cir. .
.
. .
b ut a new creat1on.
.
1119
cumc1s1on
counts f or anyt h.1ng, nor unclrcumc1s1on,

How does the New Testament conceive of the new creation?

The

New Testament describes a new creature as being the result of God's
transforming intervention in an individual's life.
believing sinner into a new creature, a saint.
freed from its past sins.

God changes the

God creates a new being

Used in this way the term "new creature" is

a label synonymous in many respects with the term "clean."

For this

paper, what is important is not the label, but the process leading to
that label.

19

The labeling of someone as a new creature results from a

Galations 6:15 (RSV).
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creative act of God.

As with cleanness, the New Testament conceives

of the new creation as a label resulting from an act of God, to be exact
from a creative act of God.
If these ideas are extended beyond the limits of the new creation,
then something very wonderful is discovered.

It is found that the Bible

conceives of God's creative activity as being the ground for both its
notion of ethical acceptability and its notion of epistemological acceptability.

The Bible suggests in various ways that, in his creative work,

God has established the standard by which things are to be judged.

This

is a truth found in the Old Testament, as well as, the New Testament.
For example, the Law that the Jews were so prone to use as a standard
for moral truth gained its authority from the fact that God had created
it.
In establishing the Law, God revealed some of the standards that
he had placed in the universe.
all, when he gave the Law.

Unfortunately, he did not reveal them

While the Law was very complete in the area

of morality and religious practice, it did not provide a standard for
the determination of material truth which is the object of this portion
of the current investigation.

Even though, the Law did not give all the

desired information, it did establish the fact that there are standards
in the universe.
Fortunately, God in his creative activity has provided a mechanism for making determinations in the area of material truth.

God has

established a way to determine whether or not various things are genuine.
He has made provision for a test to determine if, for example, some
creature is truly a coney.

He did this by establishing the principle

that things reproduce according to their own kind.
conies, while roses produce other roses.

Conies bear other
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With the universe reproducing according to the principle of
kind, man can determine an item's authenticity through a process of comparison.

An individual can take a random sampling of items already rec-

ognized as being members of a given group, compare them, preparing a
a listing of the characteristics they have in common, and, then, check
the item in question against the list to determine if it is the real
thing.

If the item has everything on the list, then the individual knows

that the item is authentic.
be taken and compared.

For example, a random sampling of conies can

The list of their shared characteristics, like

no visible tail, short ears, etc., could then serve as the standard or
test for genuine conies.

This listing would be serving as the standard

for material truth with respect to conies.

It would be the acceptability

qualifier for coneyhood.
Because of the terminological awkwardness of the preceeding paragraph, some new terminology will be introduced.

In the previous para-

graph, three terms had the tendancy to get into each other's way.
terms are "group", "characteristics" and "list."

These

This situation can be

altered by employing terminology common to the mathematical sciences.
In mathematics groups are referred to as sets.

The characteristics men-

tioned are called set-defining characteristics.

A list of set-defining

characteristics for the same set is termed the definition of that set.
With this new terminology in hand, it can be seen that the standard for
material truth--the long hoped for acceptability qualifier--amounts to
no more than the definition of the set for the category in which the object in question seeks membership.
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SU}fl1ARY

In this section of chapter 4, three things have been accomplished.
First, Cyrus H. Gordon's thesis that the Greek and Hebrew traditions are
parallel structures springing from the same foundation has been reviewed and supported.

This has permitted this investigation to journey

beyond the fruitless fields of Greek thought into the pages of the Bible.
Upon turning to the Bible, it was discovered that the Bible conceived
of epistemological truth in essentially the same way that Heidegger and
the Presocratics did.

This fact provided impetus to continue the search

for the standard for material truth, for the acceptability qualifier,
within the pages of the Bible.

Lastly, the long hoped for standard for

material truth was discovered to rest in the definition of various sets
of objects.

Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
The point has finally been reached towards which the previous
chapters have been directed.

It is now possible both to present in

final form and to evaluate the conception of truth aimed at in this investigation.

This point has been reached through the process of estab-

lishing three things.

The first thing that needed to be established was

that various attempts on the part of contemporary, Western man to link
with the belief that truth is the correspondence of statements with the
world an acceptability qualifier, a standard for truth, have failed.
Secondly, a new direction had to be established for the investigation.
This new direction was found in the writings of Martin Heidegger.

In

his attack of the various analytical theories of truth, he determined
that the primary form of truth was material, and not propositional.
This switch in the attribution of primacy brought about revolution in
theorizing about truth.

It changed the nature of the correspondence

between statements and the world from a material correspondence to a
functional correspondence.

It also shifted the search for the accept-

ability qualifier from the realm of propositional truth to the area of
material truth.

Lastly, a definition for the acceptability qualifier

had to be established.

This definition was arrived through an investi-

gation of the biblical conception of cleanness.

The acceptability

qualifier was determined to be the list of set-defining characteristics
for the category in which the object in question seeks membership.
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With
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all this established, this paper's definition of truth can be presented
and evaluated.

A DEFINITION OF TRUTH
The goal of this paper has been the production of a definition
of propositional truth.

Such a definition must come in two parts.

first part is foundational in character.

The

The foundation for the defini-

tion of propositional truth is to be laid by the defining of material
truth.

Upon this foundation will be laid the definition of propositional

truth.
The assessment that something is truly what it appears or claims
to be involves three things.

It involves first the assessors engagement

with the object in question in such a way that it can be itself.
Secondly, it involves the assessor's determination through a process of
comparison what the characteristics are that determine membership in the
desired category.

Lastly, it involves the comparison of the listing of

set-defining characteristics with the object in question.

Bearing this

in mind, material truth can be defined as the correspondence of an item
with the standard for the category to which it belongs that has been
discovered through an assessor's open experience of the world.
It is to this foundation that this paper's definition of propositional truth is to be added.

Propositional truth, following Heidegger,

is understood as referring to that state in which a statement serves to
bring about an awareness of some material truth.

The statement, "This

is a coney," is determined to be true, when it serves to reveal the fact
that it is materially true that the object referred to is a coney.

In

this view, a statement is true when it fulfills the function of revealing
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something about the world.
This is a functional, as opposed to static, account of propositional truth.

In this sense, it is similar to the Pragmatic Theory of

truth, but in contrast to the Correspondence Theory of truth.

In the

Pragmatic Theory, a statement's truth is a product of its success in
problem solving, where here it is a product of its revelatory effectiveness.

This is to be contrasted with the Correspondence Theory which

views truth as a static matching relationship.
EVALUATION
The evaluation of this theory will be considered under two
headings.

Its problems and its impact will be considered.

The Theory's Problems
For all the objections that this theory has laid to rest, it
still has two major problems.
of the acceptability qualifier.

Both problems are tied to the operation
In the first place, it can be objected

that there are groups which are homogeneous and do not have any one
characteristic in common.

Secondly, it can be objected that the accept-

ability qualifier, the standard for material truth, cannot adequately
deal with unique items.
The notion of a set-defining characteristic cannot be universally used in the formulation of the standard for material truth, because
there are sets which do not have set-defining characteristics.
example of this type of set is the extended family.

The best

lVhen one considers

the list of possible set-defining characteristics for any one extended
family, he finds that they do not even share the same family name.

This

is a problem that this paper's theory as currently formulated cannot
avoid.

If, however, this theory were supplemented with Wittgenstein's

notion of family resemblances--the doctrine that a group can be bound
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together by characteristics which, though they are not universal throughout the group, do overlap at various points in the group--the problem

.
1
d1sappears.
The second problem is the application of the acceptability
qualifier to unique items.

If, for example, there is one and only one

coney, how does one determine that it really is what it is.

The problem

amounts to the denial that a set of one item has set-defining characteristics.

This problem does not result from the fact that sets of one

item do not have characteristics, but from the fact that they are very
hard to determine and tend to be quite arbitrary in nature.

The best

method for such a determination is to consider sets of one individual to
be sets of experiences of that individual and, then, compare the experiences in the same way that various individuals would be compared.
This is really the best method, because what the assessor is interested
in really determining is not whether the individual is the individual,
but whether or not a given experience of the individual is an experience
of that individual.
The Impact of the Theory
With these objections answered, the impact of this theory can now
be considered.
sidered.

Only two of the possible areas of impact will be con-

The first area

the central issue of

philosophy of language, i.e., the nature of linguistic meaning.

The

second area is a theological issue, i.e., the doctrine of propositional
inerrancy.

1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E.
M. Anscombe (3rd ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), pp. 31-32.
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When one views propositional truth in a functional way, he is
almost required to conceive of the meaning of language functionally, too.
This would require the rejection of nominalism.
but a psychological demand.

This is not a logical

It is logically possible that a statement

can function effectively as a source of revelation, because its words
name items in the world.

Even though, it is possible, it is not necessary.

It is psychologically demanding, because Western man has long believed
that meaning and truth are congruent structures.

This demand is not

especially problematic, because there now exist highly refined functional
conceptions of language.
This theory does present a problem for people who believe that
the Bible is God's inerrant word.

It does not provide a method for

determining the truth of the Genesis account of creation.

In fact for

that matter, it does not provide a method for validating the theory of
evolution either.

This theory does not provide a method for handling

events that have happened once and only once.

Even the suggestion that

was put forward for handling sets of one individual would not work in
this situation, because there is no way to divide a single experience
into more than one experience.

Perhaps, this should not be considered

a problem for the supporter of inerrancy, but for the supporter of this
theory.

It is a problem for the supporter of this theory, because it

implies that this theory is not developed enough to handle matters of
history.

This should not come as a great shock, because this is only a

provisional theory in an investigation that is "unterwegs."
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